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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW: REAL ESTATE
FINANCE
Celeste M. Hammond*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey article concerns Illinois real estate finance cases
decided between November 1, 1989, and November 1, 1991. Although
it was difficult to categorize neatly all of the important or at least
interesting cases, this article is organized around six general headings.
Part II considers cases involving the question of whether a security
interest in land was ever created. Section A reviews cases in which
equity courts had the opportunity to protect unsophisticated parties
by recharacterizing their transactions. Section B considers cases in
which the courts had to determine whether lenders followed "standard operating procedures" entitling them to gain secured party
status in real estate. Part III discusses two types of land installment
contract cases: first, compliance with the Dwelling Unit Installment
Contract Act; and second, forfeiture. Part IV reports upon bankruptcy cases related to real estate finance. Part V contains one Illinois
Land Trust case. Part VI covers the following miscellaneous problems
in mortgage defaults:
A) Deed in lieu of foreclosure-the scope of the release;
B) Mortgagee in possession under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure
Law (IMFL);
C) Redemption period under IMFL; and
D) Due on sale clause triggering the acceleration of a mortgage.
Finally, in Part VII, this article presents a case in which the
attorney for a borrower prevailed in a malpractice suit brought by a
lender.

* B.S., Loyola University (Chicago); i.D., University of Chicago Law School; Associate
Professor, The John Marshall Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the competent
and enthusiastic assistance of Kathleen Mulholland, graduating senior of The John Marshall
Law School.
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CASES INVOLVING SECURITY INTERESTS IN REAL
ESTATE
Intended Bargain Cases

The issue facing the courts in the cases in this section was
whether to protect unsophisticated parties by recharacterizing their
transactions in order to give them their intended bargain, even if this
meant rendering the transaction legally ineffective.
Flack v. McClure' is a classic example of a court characterizing
an absolute deed as an equitable mortgage. 2 Plaintiff had entered
into a contract to sell her building to defendant for $80,000. The
closing was set for October 16, 1984. On the day the contract was
executed, September 11, 1984, plaintiff asked defendant for $9,000
to be used to pay her son's college tuition. Defendant, who was
represented by counsel, loaned plaintiff the money in exchange for
a quitclaim deed. Defendant was unable to get the financing provided
for in the contract and, thus, unable to proceed with the scheduled
closing. Thereafter, the current mortgagee foreclosed on the property
and, at the sheriff's sale in December 1984, the property was sold
to a non-litigant for $35,000. To keep that sale from being finalized,
defendant recorded his quitclaim deed and redeemed the property in
June 1985, on the final day of the redemption period, for $36,758.
Originally, plaintiff sued for specific performance of the contract,
but plaintiff later amended the complaint to include a claim that the
quitclaim deed was really an equitable mortgage.
The appellate court opinion reported testimony of the parties
indicating that only a loan was intended and that the parties intended
the quitclaim deed would not be recorded but would instead be held
as security.' The court recited the six factors to be considered by the
trial judge to determine whether an equitable mortgage exists: whether
a debt exists, the relationship of the parties, whether legal assistance
was available, the sophistication and circumstances of each party,
the adequacy of consideration, and who retained possession of the
premises. 4 Here, a debt clearly existed; seller had no legal assistance,
whereas purchaser had an attorney; and the real estate sales contract

1. 206 Ill. App. 3d 976, 565 N.E.2d 131 (1st Dist. 1990).
2. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 3.5 - 3.9 (2d
ed. 1985) [hereinafter NELSON & WHITMAN].
3. Flack, 206 I1. App. 3d at 983, 565 N.E.2d at 135.
4. Id. at 985, 565 N.E.2d at 136.
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between the litigants clearly established a property valued at $80,000
being transferred for $9,000. Moreover, for a year after plaintiff
gave defendant the quitclaim deed-until she was evicted by court
order at defendant's insistence-plaintiff retained possession. By clear
and convincing evidence, the plaintiff met the burden of proving the
elements of a mortgage. The court ordered defendant to reconvey
the property to plaintiff and imposed an equitable mortgage for the
benefit of defendant in the amount of $45,758. This amount reflected
defendant's loan to plaintiff and his purchase at the foreclosure sale.
In Verson v. Steimbergl the court protected an estranged wife
who had co-signed a deed of trust at the urging of her husband.
The wife had received no consideration from the transaction. She
complied with her husband's wishes to secure his personal debt and
upon his representation that her signature was a mere formality
necessitated by the fact that they held title in joint tenancy. The
court based its ruling on its characterization of the wife as a "stranger
to the underlying transaction. "6 The wife decided to sell the house
which had been quitclaimed to her by her husband pursuant to a
1982 divorce settlement. She brought a quiet title action to remove
the cloud of the trust deed. Thereafter, the defendants, secured
parties, counterclaimed for foreclosure of the trust deed. Although
she had signed the trust deed in 1977 to secure notes of nearly $1.5
million, plaintiff neither signed nor guaranteed the notes, had been
separated from her husband for at least a year, and received no
consideration for giving the security interest.
The court noted the general rule that "[c]onsideration for a
mortgage or trust deed usually flows between the mortgagor and the
mortgagee, but in certain situations the consideration can also flow
to a third party." '7 For example, where a wife secured notes she
made to her husband and the creditor accepted the wife's note for
less than the debt, a court in an 1891 case found consideration had
been given for the mortgage.8
And where a woman made a mortgage on her fiance's behalf,
another court found sufficient consideration for the woman's mortgage because the mortgagee bank had cancelled the man's pre-existing
debt and returned the collateral it had been holding. 9 There, the
5. 191 Ill. App. 3d 851, 548 N.E.2d 363 (1st Dist. 1989).
6. Id. at 855, 548 N.E.2d at 366.
7. Id. at 854, 548 N.E.2d at 365.
8. Post v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 Ill. 559, 28 N.E. 978 (1891).
9. State Bank v. Sorenson, 167 Il1. App. 3d 674, 521 N.E.2d 587 (2d Dist.), appeal
denied, 122 I1. 2d 595, 530 N.E.2d 265 (1988).
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mortgagee's change in condition provided the consideration. 0
In contrast, in Verson the wife had been separated from her
husband for a year, and the debt was incurred solely so that the
husband could complete a wholly-leveraged purchase of the businesses
in which he alone worked. She was a stranger to the transaction."
Interestingly, there was no indication from the trial court record
of any attempt by the secured party to recover on the promissory
notes from the makers, one of whom was the son-in-law of the
secured party. The defendants acknowledged that they never foreclosed on the real estate mortgage they had on their daughter and
son-in-law's property. The husband of plaintiff had filed bankruptcy
before the quiet title action was filed and discharged the debts for
12
which the trust deed was given.
In situations where a party co-signs a mortgage to secure the
sole debt of another, a lender would be wise to obtain some kind
of written statement indicating that he signs to induce the lender to
make the loan and that the making of the loan is valuable consideration to the co-signer. Such a document would serve to estop the
co-signer from denying the validity of the security interest at a later
time.
In a split decision, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District,
in Miller v. Wines,' 3 refused to protect the equitable title of a land
installment contract buyer who signed an instrument entitled "Subordination of Real Estate Contract" and who received no valuable
consideration beyond the one dollar recited in the instrument. The
short version of the facts provided by Justice Steigmann in his
dissenting opinion supports the description, shared by the majority
of the court, of the ruling as "harsh,"' 4 and the conclusion that the
law should be changed.
In 1974, Miller entered into a land installment contract with
Wines for five acres, including a residence, for a price of $28,000.
Wines retained the right to mortgage the property to the extent of
the unpaid balance. Miller took possession and resided on the property. By November of 1984, Miller had paid over $23,400 to Wines,
leaving an unpaid balance of about $4,500. Wines executed a mortgage on the land contract property to the Fireman's Fund Mortgage

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 684, 521 N.E.2d at 594.
Verson, 191 Ill.
App. 3d at 855, 548 N.E.2d at 366.
Id. at 854-55, 548 N.E.2d at 366.
197 Ill.
App. 3d 447, 554 N.E.2d 784 (4th Dist. 1990).
Id. at 456, 554 N.E.2d at 790 (Steigmann, J., dissenting).
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Corporation to secure a loan of $35,000. Miller signed a document
by which he purportedly subordinated his $24,500 interest in the real
estate to the mortgagee. Miller received nothing in exchange.
The dissent doubted whether the subordination agreement was
"clear and unambiguous" as argued by the mortgage company and
as characterized by the majority of the court." In distinguishing the
situation here from one where a relative or friend is co-signing a
note to secure a loan, the dissent argued that "the mortgage company
knew that Miller was going to be asked by Wines to sign . . . and
it knew that Miller would derive no benefit therefrom, while signing
away what is likely to be the major financial asset of his life.' ' 6 At
least where, as here, an institutional lender sets up the transaction,
and where, as here, no third party relies on the recordation of the
relevant instrument, it seems fair to impose an affirmative duty on
the mortgage company to insure that a subordinated land owner,
like Miller, "knowingly and voluntarily"'' 7 waived his property interest before the agreement would be found binding."
Finally, a decision of the Illinois Appellate Court, First District,
emphasizes how risky it is for an individual to become a party to a
real estate transaction without being represented by a fairly sophisticated real estate attorney. 9 Although the appellate court echoed the
emotions of the trial court judge that the plaintiff "has been very
badly treated,''20 it affirmed the trial court. The trial court found
that the plaintiff, a vendee under a land installment contract with a
vendor who was only the beneficiary of a land trust that held both
legal and equitable title to the land, and who had no power of
direction regarding transfer of title, had no equitable title in the real

15. Provisions of the agreement are set forth in the text of the opinion, id.at 449-50, 554
N.E.2d at 786. Justice Steigmann calls the agreement "an example of legalese at its worst,
clearly (and probably eventually) beyond the ken of all but the most intelligent and financially
sophisticated laymen." Id. at 455, 554 N.E.2d at 789 (Steigmann, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 455, 554 N.E.2d at 790 (Steigmann, J.,dissenting).
17. Id. at 456, 554 N.E.2d at 790 (Steigmann, J., dissenting).
18. See NELSON & Wm AT , supra note 2. Nelson and Whitman discuss the enforceability
of true "subordination" agreements included as part of the purchase contract in favor of the
construction lender as to the lien of the vendee for any earnest money or down payment
collected by developer during the construction period. As in Miller, the subordinating purchaser
will ordinarily be entirely unsophisticated and is unlikely to have any concept of the significance
of the subordination provision. Nelson and Whitman conclude that "it might well be argued
that such subordinations by contract vendees are too vague or too unfair to enforce." NELSON
& WmmAN, supra note 2, § 13.3.
19. Hong Sik In v. Cheng, No. 1-90-0516, 1991 WL 230243, at *3 (Ill.
App. 1st Dist.
1991).
20. Id. at *5.
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estate. Therefore, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's quiet title
action. The court refused to protect the plaintiff by recognizing an
interest in the land even though she had paid $30,000 down and
another $20,000 under a novation agreement plus monthly installments over a five year period on a contract price of $50,000. The
court left plaintiff to pursue a claim for money damages.
Plaintiff, who had just arrived from Korea, entered into a
$100,000 land installment contract in 1981 for the purchase of
property on a commercial street in Chicago. If plaintiff had been
represented by competent counsel, who presumably would have required a title commitment before executing the contract, she would
have learned that vendors in 1976 had transferred their title to an
Illinois land trust, naming LaSalle National Bank as trustee and
reserving to themselves sole beneficial interest. The trust agreement
provided that the trustee had full power and authority to sell and
convey the trust property. Hence, vendors would have to direct the
trustee to enter into the contract for any interest in real property to
Therefore, the plaintiff acquired a right in
flow to plaintiff, vendee.
21
personal property only.
If vendee had retained competent counsel, that counsel would
have advised recordation of the land installment contract to give
notice to third parties. Instead, what happened was that the contract
was recorded, but probably as a "wild deed" outside the chain of
title,22 since vendor had no authority to transfer title. Moreover, the
final payment date provided for in the contract had expired. Presumably, the contract was terminated by 1987 when the vendor directed
the trustee to transfer to Hicks, an investor-buyer who purchased
for $60,000, and to Affiliated Bank, which provided a purchase
money loan secured by a mortgage from Hicks. Also, even if there
was a valid novation between vendor and vendee extending the final
payment date, it was not recorded and, therefore, did not bind
subsequent parties in the chain of title without notice.
Finally, an attorney for vendee would have noticed that the
installment land contract failed to state that vendor promised to
convey title or deliver a warranty or trustee's deed and also failed
to reveal the existence of the land trust. The absence of these
promises, which would have obligated vendor to effect a transfer of
title, eliminated any basis for finding equitable title in vendee by
23
equitable conversion or otherwise.
21. Id.
22. ROBERT KRATOVIL & RAYMOND J. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW § 9.08 (9th ed. 1988).

23. Hong Sik In, 1991 WL 230243, at *5.
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The fact that defendants Hicks and Affiliated Bank were "aware
of" plaintiff's claim of an interest in the property, that they knew
of the installment contract, and knew that a tenant on the premises
paid rent to plaintiff until the time of the litigation, did not give
them "notice by inquiry." 24 This meant Hicks never had a duty to
find out who the plaintiff was because "she was never an owner"
of real estate. 25 The fact that neither Hicks nor the contract vendor
26
sent plaintiff a notice of intent to forfeit the installment contract
did not strengthen plaintiff's basic argument that she had an equitable
title. The Appellate Court, First District, held that there was no
exception to the general rule that "one claiming by, through or under
a beneficiary of a land trust cannot prevail over the rights of a
holder of a subsequently acquired interest in the real property. ' 27
B. Cases Dealing With Whether the Lender Performs Effectively
in Its Attempt to Obtain a Security Interest in Real Estate
28 lender argued
In Uptown National Bank of Chicago v. Strainer,
that its complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action for an
equitable lien against the real and personal property of a co-borrower/guarantor of the loan contract and appealed the trial court's
dismissal. The defendant's deceased husband had allegedly misrepresented his assets, liabilities, and income in certain financing statements made to plaintiff in 1983 and 1985 initially to induce plaintiff
to lend him money and later to extend the time for payment. Lender
required defendant to be a co-borrower on some of the notes made
by her husband and to guarantee other notes. The contract defendant
signed stated in part that neither she nor her husband would dispose
of any of their personal assets nor allow any liens to be placed
thereon without the express permission of lender. 29 Although one of
the promissory notes signed by defendant's husband specifically
provided for a security interest in accounts receivable, inventory,
fixtures, and equipment, none of the notes specified a security interest
in the couple's personal assets, which included Illinois and Florida
residences.

24. Id. at *4.
25. Id. (quoting trial judge).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 5 (quoting Chicago Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cacciatore, 25 Ill. 2d 535, 54748, 185 N.E.2d 670, 676 (1962)).
28. 218 Ill. App. 3d 905, 578 N.E.2d 1165 (1st Dist. 1991).
29. Id. at 906, 578 N.E.2d at 1166.
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In February 1986, about three months prior to his death, the
husband conveyed his interest in the real estate to defendant. In
September 1989, defendant sold the Florida real estate and disposed
of the sales proceeds (some of which she applied to a mortgage on
the Illinois real estate).
In its action, plaintiff claimed a right to an equitable lien in the
Illinois real estate and agreed that defendant's 1985 agreement not
to sell any personal assets created a security interest because the
personal financial statement sufficiently identified the property. The
court rejected lender's agreement because the notes could have included the couple's personal assets (as they included business assets),
and such omission suggested that the parties did not intend these
assets to be security. 0 The court also noted that since the complaint
made no allegation of fraud against the wife, unjust enrichment
would not serve as a basis for an equitable lien.
The lender's case is reminiscent of arguments made, but not
successfully, 3 that a negative covenant not to sell or encumber certain
real estate created a security interest in favor of the creditor.3 2 As
Professor Grant Gilmore advised in his treatise on security interests
in personal property:
Negative Covenants should not, it is submitted, be allowed to
operate as informal or inchoate security arrangements, even against
third parties with notice. If a creditor wants security, let him take
a security interest in some recognized form: mortgage, pledge,
Article 9 security interest or whatnot. If he wants protection against
third parties, let him take possession of the collateral or file. Nothing
is to be gained by giving shadowy effectiveness to informal
arrangements which conform to no recognized pattern.33
Touche! to lenders who want security interests in real property.
Two courts, one a state appellate court and the other a federal
bankruptcy court, reached opposite conclusions on the following
issue: Whether it is necessary for a lender with a perfected security
interest in a mobile home to make a "fixture filing" in the real
estate records under Article IX of the Uniform Commercial Code
when the mobile home later becomes attached to the land in order
for the lender to have priority over a subsequent mortgagee.

30. Id. at 908, 578 N.E.2d at 1168.
31. Contra Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 392 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1964).
32. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 3.38.
33. GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY

1017
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In Rock Island Bank v. Anderson,3 4 two financial institutions
competed for priority status for their liens on a mobile home. The
Andersons purchased the mobile home from First Federal Savings
and Loan Association of Davenport, Iowa, on October 28, 1982.
First Federal perfected its security interest in the mobile home by
complying with state requirements for obtaining a security interest
in a motor vehicle or mobile home."5 Three months later, the Andersons moved the mobile home to leased ground in Mercer County,
Illinois, placed it on cinder block foundation, added a room, and
attached a garage.
Three years later, the Andersons borrowed money from the Rock
Island Bank. The bank took a trust deed along with an assignment
of the leasehold interest in the county where the mobile home was
situated. The Andersons defaulted on the bank loan, and the bank
filed a foreclosure action against the Andersons, unknown owners,
and non-record claimants. The trial court found a prior lien in the
Rock Island Bank, ahead of First Federal, because the latter had
failed to make a fixture filing in the county recorder of deeds office
36
once the mobile home became attached to the real estate.
The Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, reversed and remanded on the basis of a strained interpretation of the word "perfect," citing Black's Law Dictionary,37 instead of considering the
applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court suggested
that the Rock Island Bank could have protected itself by asking to
see the motor vehicle registration because it knew that a mobile home
was already on the premises. It would be too great a burden for
First Federal to "continuously monitor and track the peregrinations
' 38
of a mobile home."
The dissent criticized the majority for citing only to Black's Law
Dictionary (and a 1933 edition at that) and being "in direct defiance
of Section 9-313 of the [Uniform Commercial] Code." 3 9 Justice Barry
explained that the Code does not define "perfection" but sets forth
requirements if a secured party is to maintain priority over conflicting
interests of an encumbrance in personal property which is to become

34. 178 II1. App. 3d 1068, 534 N.E.2d 200 (3d Dist. 1989).
35. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 951/2 para. 3-202(b) (1989). Illinois requires a lender to file
with the Secretary of State and to obtain a notation on the title document.
36. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-313 (1987) (Illinois fixture filing requirements.).
37. Rock Island Bank, 178 Il. App. 3d at 1070, 534 N.E.2d at 201-02.
38. Id. at 1070, 534 N.E.2d at 202.
39. Id. at 1071, 534 N.E.2d at 203 (Barry, J., dissenting).
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a fixture. "The wary lender is advised to prefile its financing statement or mortgage in the county where the home is to become affixed
....

"40

Yet Justice Barry may have weakened the usefulness of his

dissent in construing Article IX by admitting that he might have
agreed with the majority if the facts had been different. For Justice
Barry, the determinative facts were that 1) First Federal knew from
the beginning that the Andersons intended to affix the mobile home
to real estate, and 2) the Rock Island Bank could not determine,
because of the improvements, that the structure was a "mobile"
41
home.
In In re Beabout, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, 42 a federal
bankruptcy court criticized the majority opinion in Rock Island
Bank4l 3 and adopted the dissent's statutory construction. While the
court is correct in its criticism, it would have been helpful if it had
provided some explanation or authority for refusing to follow what
it identifies as the "only decision of an Illinois state court dealing
with the application of section 9-313 in a factual situation similar to
the instant case." 44 Instead, the Beabout opinion expertly interprets
section 9-313 of the Code, emphasizing the plain language of the
statute4" and pointing out that the revisions of the Code in 1972 were
intended to change the earlier version's clear preference for chattel
security interests over real estate interests. 6
The facts in Beabout are somewhat different than those in Rock
Island Bank. In 1979, Farm Credit Bank obtained a mortgage in the
real estate. In 1983, the Bank of Casey financed the purchase of a
mobile home by the debtors and perfected its lien by recording on
the certificate of title issued by the secretary of state. The debtors
then placed the mobile home on the land, erected a concrete foundation, put in sidewalks, built a deck, and attached a garage. The
Bank of Casey argued that since it properly perfected its security
interest while the mobile home was personal property, its security
interest remained effective even after the mobile home became a

40. Id. at 1072, 534 N.E.2d at 203 (Barry, J. dissenting).
41. Id. at 1073, 534 N.E.2d at 203 (Barry, J., dissenting).
42. 110 B.R. 883 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1990).
43. 178 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 534 N.E.2d 200 (3d Dist. 1989).
44. Beabout, 110 B.R. at 886.
45. "[T]he plain language of section 9-313, which requires that a security interest in fixtures
be perfected by a fixture filing in the real estate records ... makes clear that a perfected
security interest in personal property is no longer effective once the property is changed into
realty." 110 B.R. at 887.
46. 110 B.R. at 887-88; see also NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 9.7.
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fixture. The trustee in bankruptcy took the position that once the
home became a fixture, the Bank of Casey was required to make a
fixture filing within 10 days after the fixtures were affixed to the
realty47 in order to attain priority over the existing mortgagee of the
real estate.
In ruling against the purchase money lender of the mobile home,
the court acknowledged the seeming unfairness to the Bank of Casey
but felt bound by "statutory directives."' 4 The court left it to the
legislature to make changes if the statute is unreasonable as applied
to mobile home financing because the mobility of the chattels makes
it difficult to determine the proper county in which the purchase
money lender should file.
III.
A.

LAND INSTALLMENT CONTRACT CASES

Dwelling Unit Installment Contract Act

In 1991, the Illinois Supreme Court made clear the broad applicability of the requirements that installment land contract sellers
must meet under the Dwelling Unit Installment Contract Act. 49 Ruva
v. Menta ° involved an assignment of a land installment contract by
the original vendee two years after the contract was entered into.
The Dwelling Unit Installment Contract Act provides that any
installment contract for the sale of a dwelling unit will be voidable
by the buyer unless there is attached or incorporated by reference to
the contract: 1) a certificate of compliance; 5 or 2) an express written
warranty that no notice from any city, village, or other governmental
authority of any building code violation that existed before the
installment contract was executed had been received by the contract
seller within 10 years of the date of contract execution;52 or 3) if any

47. See NELSON & WHrTMAN, supra note 2, § 9.7.
48. 110 B.R. at 888.

49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 8.21 et seq. (1989). This was enacted in 1967 to protect
buyers of "dwelling structures," defined to include "any private home or residence, or any
family units." ILL. REV. STAT.
building or structure to be occupied or resided in by 12 or less
ch. 29, para. 8.21(b) (1989).
2d 257, 572 N.E.2d 888 (1991).
50. 143 Ill.
51. "Certificate of compliance" isdefined as "an affidavit executed by a contract seller
stating that the dwelling structure was inspected within 30 days before the contract was executed
by an Inspector of the Municipality or County wherein the premises is located, and that at
the date of the execution of the contract the dwelling structure isnot in violation of any
dwelling code." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 8.21(0 (1989).
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 8.22 (1989).
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such notice had been received, a list of all such notices so received
with a detailed statement of all violations referred to in the notices. 3
In Ruva, the defendants entered into an installment land sale
contract for the purchase of a restaurant and a 1,200 square feet,
three bedroom home in 1984. By that contract the home was to be
used for residential purposes. The sale price was $180,000 with a
$50,000 down payment and the balance payable in 10 years in
monthly installments. Clause 7 of the contract contained an express
written warranty which seemed to meet the requirements of the Act. 54
In August 1986, with the consent of the original sellers, defendants
assigned their interests to the plaintiff by an assignment instrument
that incorporated by reference the terms of the 1984 contract. 5
Plaintiffs operated the restaurant for about one month when
they received a letter from the Department of Public Health informing
them that two inspections in August 1986 revealed that the private
sewer system on the property might be inadequate. The plaintiffs
were unable to resolve the sewer system problem with the original
seller and defendant. They vacated the premises and filed a complaint
for rescission based on defendant's failure to include within the
assignment a certificate of compliance or a written warranty as
56
required by the Act.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the assignment of the
installment contract was itself an "installment contract" within the
meaning of the Act by construing the language of the Act, "any
contract or agreement,' ' 7 to apply where, as here, the assigning
document began: "THIS AGREEMENT
....
1 Also, the court
rejected defendant's argument that the Act did not apply since a
clause in the installment contract expressly provided that they "had
no right, title or interest in the real estate . . . . -59 Although the
parties to a real estate contract may prevent "equitable conversion,"
whereby the buyer becomes the owner of an equitable interest in the
real estate upon executing the sales contract and seller is left with
only legal title,60 from occurring, 6' the court ruled that defendant

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Ruva, 143 Ill.
2d at 260, 572 N.E.2d at 890.
Id. at 261-62, 572 N.E.2d at 890.
Id. at 262, 572 N.E.2d at 891.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 8.21(e) (1989).
Ruva, 143 Ill.
2d at 263, 572 N.E.2d at 891.
Id. at 261, 263-64, 572 N.E.2d at 890, 892-93.
A. JAMEs CASNER, III AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.22 (1952).
Ruva, 143 I1. 2d at 264, 572 N.E.2d at 892 (citing Eade v. Brownlee, 29 Ill.
2d 214,
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owned a "beneficial interest" within the meaning of the Act. 62
Defendants' possessory interest and right to convey were evidence of
63
a beneficial interest.
Finally, the court distinguished Kindred v. Stuhr,6 where the
Act was held not to apply. In Kindred a motel was held not to be
a dwelling unit within the meaning of the Act because "[o]rdinarily,
motels are considered as transitory lodgings, not family dwellings. "63
The presence of a manager's unit within the motel did not transform
the motel into a dwelling structure since the unit was considered
"incidental to the operation of the motel and not a family dwelling. '"66 In Ruva, the Illinois Supreme Court stressed the contract's
provision that the home is to be used solely for residential purposes
as evidence that the home is a dwelling structure within meaning of
the Act, 67 and specifically held that the sale of two structures, one
of which was a restaurant, did not render the home incidental to the
former." The court did not consider any arguments concerning the
primary use of the premises (residential v. commercial; personal v.
investment) even though the house was not used by the plaintiff as
a personal residence but was leased.6 9
In spite of the Illinois Supreme Court's strong position in Ruva,
the doctrine of laches again served as a defense of the land contract
vendor in a decision of the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District,
Renth v. Krausz. 0 In this case, the plaintiff delayed in bringing the
rescission action. The court measured the delay from the date of
contract execution when "constructive knowledge of the statute ...
gave them a right to void the contract,"'7 a period of six years.7 2 In
addition to the delay, the court found that the action was barred
due to a decrease in value of the land by $115,000, forty-two percent

61. Ruva, 143 I1. 2d at 264, 572 N.E.2d at 892 (citing Eade v. Brownlee, 29 Il. 2d 214,
193 N.E.2d 786 (1963)).
62. 143 Il. 2d at 266, 572 N.E.2d at 893.
63. Id.
App. 3d 194, 507 N.E.2d 1379 (3d Dist. 1987).
64. 155 Ill.
65. Id. at 196, 507 N.E.2d at 1381.
66. Id.
67. Ruva, 143 11. 2d at 268, 572 N.E.2d at 893-94.
68. Id. at 268, 572 N.E.2d at 893-94.
69. Id. at 267, 572 N.E.2d at 893.
2d 648,
70. 219 Il1. App. 3d 120, 579 N.E.2d 11 (5th Dist. 1991), appeal denied, 143 Ill.
587 N.E.2d 1024 (1992).
71. Id. at 122, at 579 N.E.2d at 13.
72. Id. at 123, 579 N.E.2d at 13-14.
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of the contract sale price, and a substantial prejudice to the defendant-vendor. The court cited Bledsoe v. Carpenter7 and Hay v.
Albrecht,74 both of which held that laches barred a rescission action
by a vendee. The Illinois Supreme Court distinguished Courtois v.
Millard,7 a case in which the fifth district affirmed the circuit court's
rescission and held that the circuit court's refusal to impose laches
was not an abuse of discretion. 76 In Millard, there was no evidence
that the property had depreciated during the five-year delay in
bringing the case and, thus, the "critical fact" making it 'inequitable
to grant relief' '

B.

77

was not present.

Forfeiture

Two cases during the survey period involved the question of
whether forfeiture provisions in land installment contracts preclude
other remedies for the vendor. In each case the court based its ruling
on the language of the contract.
In Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Ascher,7 defendants, as beneficiaries of certain land trusts that held title to 11 condominium
units, entered into a land installment contract on April 1, 1980, with
First Bank of Oak Park as trustee of a land trust, vendee. The
contract provided that if vendee defaulted, sellers, at their option,
could forfeit the agreement and retain payments made 'in full
satisfaction and as liquidated damages.'

' ' 79

In paragraph fifteen, it

provided that "[tihe remedy of forfeiture herein given to Seller shall
be exclusive of any other remedy[.]" 80
In an assignment dated February 27, 1981, defendants sold their
vendor interest in the installment land and their beneficial interest in
the land trusts to plaintiff. "The assignment agreement ...

contained

a guaranty clause where defendants guaranteed [vendee's] obligation
under the installment agreement.""

73. 163 I1. App. 3d 823, 516 N.E.2d 1013 (3d Dist. 1987).
74. 169 III. App. 3d 120, 523 N.E.2d 211 (2d Dist. 1988).
75. 174 III. App. 3d 716, 529 N.E.2d 77 (5th Dist. 1988).
76. Id. at 722-23, 529 N.E.2d at 81.
77. Renth, 219 I1. App. 3d at 123, 579 N.E.2d at 14 (quoting McKey v. McKean, 384 III.
112, 126, 51 N.E.2d 189, 196 (1943)).
78. 196 111.
App. 3d 570, 554 N.E.2d 409 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 133 I11.
2d 553, 561
N.E.2d 687 (1990).
79. Id. at 572, 554 N.E.2d at 410.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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On April 1, 1985, vendee failed to pay the balance under the
installment contract and defendants did not pay the balance as
guarantors. In November 1986, defendants were held to be in default
for failure to file an appearance in an action for foreclosure filed
by plaintiff. Count III of plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendants
were liable for any deficiency between the foreclosure sale price and
the amount due under the installment contract. The trial court entered
a judgment of foreclosure and sale and provided that if there were
a deficiency, vendee would be liable, as would defendants, by their
guarantee. The judgment showed a balance of $595,500. Plaintiffs
purchased at the sheriff's sale for $413,000, leaving a deficiency of

about $191,000.82
Afterwards, defendants obtained leave of the court to file an
appearance and counterclaim in March 1987. On plaintiff's motion,
the trial judge dismissed Count III, from which this appeal was
taken.
The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed the trial
court dismissal because the guarantor "is bound only to the extent
and in the matter and under the circumstances pointed out in the
obligation.' '83 A reference in the assignment agreement to "under
said contracts'"' indicated that the parties intended to limit the
guarantors' liability to the obligation of vendee. Since the installment
contract provided forfeiture as the sole remedy, "[d]efendants' guaranty . . . would not extend beyond forfeiture. ' 85 Hence, defendants
were not liable for any deficiency.
In contrast with the facts of Ascher,8 6 the installment land
contract in Kohrs v. Barth87 provided that if vendee defaulted, vendor
would retain all payments as liquidated damages, buyer would quit
the premises, and buyer would give seller a quitclaim deed of all
buyer's interest in the premises-typical forfeiture provisions. The
Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, held that in the absence of a
provision that forfeiture was the sole or exclusive remedy, the seller
had a right to bring its action for specific performance. The appellate

App. 3d at 573, 554 N.E.2d at 410.
82. 196 Ill.
App.
83. Id. at 574, 554 N.E.2d at 411 (citing Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Bergmen, 153 Ill.
2d 540, 511 N.E.2d
3d 470, 473, 505 N.E.2d 1236, 1238 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 115 Ill.
427 (1987)).
84. Id. at 574, 554 N.E.2d at 411.
85. Id. at 575, 554 N.E.2d at 412.
86. Citicorp Say. of I1. v. Ascher, 196 Ill. App. 3d 570, 554 N.E.2d 409 (1st Dist.), appeal
denied, 133 11.2d 553, 561 N.E.2d 687 (1990).
App. 3d 468, 570 N.E.2d 1273 (5th Dist. 1991).
87. 212 Ill.
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court thus affirmed the trial court's order that vendee pay the balance
of the contract plus interest, some $16,556, and that vendor convey
title to vendee upon such payment.88 The court distinguished prior
case law which held that no action for specific performance would
lie where the contract provides that one of two things shall be done
at the election of the party who must perform, i.e., either the
performance of the act or the payment of a sum of money. 89
Obviously, Illinois attorneys should be precise in drafting provisions for defaults under land installment contracts. The provisions
of the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (IMFL) 90 did not apply in
either of these cases because it was not effective as to land installment
contracts in existence before July 1, 1987. Where IMFL applies, its
foreclosure process is the exclusive method of dealing with vendees'
default in some cases 9' and a permitted one in all others. 92 The
question lingers, however, of whether IMFL by itself precludes an
action for specific performance of a land contract. After all, a land
contract is both a sales contract and a financing device. IMFL would
seem to apply only to the latter aspect of the land contract transaction.
IV.
A.

BANKRUPTCY

"Lien Stripping" Under Section 506

When a mortgagor files a petition in bankruptcy, 9 the mortgagee's claim to be a creditor with special protection because of its
security interest in certain real estate will be determined under section
506 of the Bankruptcy Code.94 Much recent litigation has involved
the question of whether the mortgagee's secured position may be
limited or reduced through a process known as "lien stripping" to

the fair market value of the real estate when the debtor seeks the

88. Id. at 471, 570 N.E.2d at 1275.
89. Id. at 470-71, 570 N.E.2d at 1275-76 (citing Koch v. Streuter, 218 Ill. 546, 75 N.E.

1049 (1905); Lyman v. Gedney, 114 111.388, 29 N.E. 282 (1885)).
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 15-1101 to 15-1706 (1989).
91. Id. para. 15-1106(a)(2).
92. Id. para. 15-1106(c).
93. The Bankruptcy Code is found in Title 11, United States Code. 11 U.S.C. § 701-66
(1988) (straight liquidation of individual bankrupt debtor's estate); 11 U.S.C. § 1101-74 (1988)
(corporate reorganization); 11 U.S.C. § 1301-30 (1988) (adjustment of debts of an individual
with regular income).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988).
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protection of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 95 With a general
decline in real property values during the current economic downturn,
fair market value is more likely to be less than the amount of the
lien than would have been the case in the inflationary 1980's. The
split of opinions, with a slim majority holding that the debtor could
avoid the lien to the extent it exceeded the debtor's interest in the
property, 96 and a minority holding that the undersecured portion of
an undersecured debt is not avoidable, 97 has been resolved by the
United States Supreme Court by a 6-2 decision in Dewsnup v. Timm.9"
After discussing several recent bankruptcy cases in Illinois, this article
will consider the effect of Dewsnup.
The bankruptcy court in In re LeaveiW9 recognized that while
Chapter 7 debtors can use section 506 to strip liens, debtors may
not use section 506(d) to avoid non-dischargeable tax liens. In each
of the three cases combined for purposes of the adversary proceeding, 00 the debtors owned real property against which federal tax liens
had been filed and the property was encumbered by a first mortgage
which exceeded the value of the property. For example, in two of
the cases William and Charmaine Chenoweth owned real property
subject to a first mortgage of $65,000; they filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy relief on March 30, 1990. On November 6, 1989, an
assessment for unpaid federal income taxes was made against debtors
in the amount of $84,213. Further income tax assessments in amounts
of $8,600 and $57,000 were made. Tax liens for these were filed in
early 1990 just before debtors filed for bankruptcy. In addition a
judgment debtor claimed a lien in the amount of $38,000. The debtors
alleged that the appraised value of the real estate was only $55,000.
They sought to avoid and discharge all security interests beyond the
$55,000 value that would be security to the first mortgagee.
Because the tax debts were not dischargeable in bankruptcy'0 '
and would attach to any personal or real property of the debtors
95. See discussion of cases infra.
96. See, e.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989); In
re Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537 (llth Cir. 1989); In re Lindsey, 823 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987); In
re Brouse, 110 B.R. 539 (Bankr. Colo. 1990); In re Moses, 110 B.R. 962 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1990); In re Tanner, 14 B.R. 933 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981).
97. See, e.g., In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Lange, 120 B.R. 132
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990); In re Shrum, 98 B.R. 995 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989).
98. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
99. 124 B.R. 535 (Bankr. S.D. I1. 1991).
100. Id. at 536 (In each case, the United States opposed avoidance of its liens under §
506(d)).
101. Id. at 540 (The tax debts were non-dischargeable as having been assessed within 240
days of the filing for bankruptcy under I1 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(l)(A), 507(a)(7)(A)(ii)) (1988).
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after liquidation in bankruptcy, 0 2 the court distinguished the situations here from other cases where avoidance was allowed but the tax
liens may have been dischargeable. 13 Here, the court held that
avoidance of the tax liens under section 506(d) would effectuate no
Bankruptcy Code policy.' °4
05 the federal
In United States v. Zlogar,1
district court affirmed
6
a decision of the bankruptcy court' which held that a Chapter 7
debtor could avoid liens on real property to the extent that they
exceeded the value of debtor's interest in the property, even though
the debtor intended to retain the property. The court reasoned that
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Lindsey'07 approved
lien stripping because it insures that secured creditors remain in the
same position whether or not bankruptcy proceedings are engaged.
Where secured creditors foreclose their liens and bypass bankruptcy,
they receive the market value of the interest secured by the lien and
a deficiency judgment for the remainder. Using section 506, secured
creditors obtain a secured interest equal to the market value of such
interest. They can then foreclose on this and become an unsecured
creditor for the rest. °8
Moreover, the court expressly held that post-petition appreciation
(after lien-stripping) of the real estate should inure to the benefit of
the debtor consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's policy of giving
the debtor a "fresh start" after bankruptcy.'0 9
Nowhere did the court address the fact that some of the liens
the debtor sought to strip were held by the IRS. Perhaps, as noted
by the bankruptcy court, this was because neither the Illinois Department of Revenue nor the IRS "asserted that the debtor's tax
0
obligations [were] nondischargeable.""
In Goins v. Diamond Mortgage Corp.,"' chapter 13 debtors
filed a complaint seeking to scale down the mortgage debt owed to

102. Id. (citing In re Wukelic, 544 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1976); In re Frengel, 115 B.R. 569
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989)).
103. Id. (citing In re Crawford, 115 B.R. 381 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990)).
104. Id. at 541.
105. 126 B.R. 53 (N.D. Il. 1991).
106. 101 B.R. 1 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1990).

107. 823 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987).
108. Zlogar, 126 B.R. at 56.
109. Id.at 58.
110. 101 B.R. at 3; compare In re Leavell, 124 B.R. 535, (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991) (tax liens
held nondischargeable).
111. 119 B.R. 156 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
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the mortgagee. Although they admitted they owed the creditor $47,000
or more, their home, the sole security for Diamond's loan, was only
worth $43,000. The debtors wanted the court to hold that, under
section 506, $43,000 of claim was secured" 2 and $4,000 was unsecured. They proposed to pay off the secured claim in full over sixty
months (and keep the house) and pay off the unsecured claim at ten
cents on the dollar over the same sixty month period.
While the court felt is was clear a debtor in Chapter 13 could
bifurcate the claim of an undersecured creditor asserting a claim on
personalty or a debtor's residence and other collateral," 3 the court
focused on the narrower issue of whether a debtor can bifurcate a
claim when the only collateral is the debtor's residence. Creditor,
relying on earlier bankruptcy court decisions" 4 and the language of
section 1322(b)(2),"15 argued that the debtor may not divide claims
of home mortgagees where the only collateral is the debtor's principal
residence into secured and unsecured portions. As the Fifth Circuit
has noted, the section 1322(b)(2) exception to the right of debtor to
modify certain secured claims "was ... in response to perceptions,
or to suggestions advanced in the legislative hearings ... that, homemortgagor [sic] lenders, performing a valuable social service through
their loans, needed special protection against modification .... ,, ,6
Nevertheless, just as the Seventh Circuit had used statutory
construction to hold that a debtor's deceleration of an accelerated
mortgage is a permissible "cure" of a default rather than a prohibited
"modification" of the mortgage, ' 7 the bankruptcy court used statutory construction to reason that it is consistent "to read [s]ection
506(a) and [slection 1322(b)(2) independently of one another.""'
Using this approach, Diamond, as holder of a secured claim, was
not allowed to have its $43,000 secured claim altered because Diamond's only collateral was the debtor's home. However, as the holder

506(a), (d) (1988).
113. 119 B.R. at 159.
114. Id. at 158 (citing In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988); In re Roberts, 99
B.R. 653 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); In re Chavez, 117 B.R. 733 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re
Sauber, 115 B.R. 197 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990)).
115. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) provides that "the [Chapter 13] plan may only . . . modify the
rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave
unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims."
116. Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984).
117. In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1984).
118. Goins, 119 B.R. at 161.
112. 11 U.S.C. §
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of a $4,000 unsecured claim, Diamond's rights were subject to
modification by the Chapter 13 plan."19 The court explained that, if,
instead, Diamond had been fully secured, the debtors' only remedy
would have been a section 1322(b)(5) cure or a pay off in full over
the plan's life.'1 °
In Dewsnup v. Timm,' 2' creditor loaned $119,000 to debtor and
her husband, now deceased, and obtained a lien on two parcels of
real estate in Utah in 1978. Debtor defaulted in 1979. Although
creditor issued a notice of default in 1981, debtor filed several
Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization petitions that were dismissed.
In June 1984, debtor petitioned for protection under Chapter 7.
Because of the pendency of these bankruptcy proceedings, creditor
was unable to proceed to a foreclosure sale. In 1987, debtor sought
to "avoid" a part of the creditor's lien because the value of the real
estate had decreased to $39,000. The bankruptcy court refused to
grant this relief.' m It assumed the property had been abandoned by
the trustee, and, as such, the property was not covered by section
506(d). The federal district court and the Court of Appeals for the
23
Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Noting a conflict between the Tenth Circuit and the Third
Circuit,' 24 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. After
considering the arguments of the parties and their "amici," the Court
noted the "difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion
that would apply to all possible fact situations."'' 2 It specifically
limited the opinion to the facts of the case before it and "allow[ed]
other facts to await their legal resolution on another day.""16
In Dewsnup, the Supreme Court adopted the theory of the
United States government- "that [section] 506(d) does not allow
petitioner to 'strip down' respondents' lien, because respondents'
claim is secured by a lien and has been fully allowed pursuant to
[section] 502."117 The Court explained that the practical effect of
debtor's argument would be to freeze the secured creditor's interest
at the judicially determined value, thereby allowing any appreciation

119. Id.
120. Id. at 161-62.
121. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).

122. Inre Dewsnup, 87 B.R. 676 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990).
Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 776.
Id. at 778.
Id.
Id.
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by the time of the foreclosure sale to benefit debtor - a windfall.
Unsatisfied with this result, the Court held that the creditor's lien
stays with the real estate until the foreclosure because that is what
the mortgagor and mortgagee bargained for. Any increase in valuation inures to the benefit of the creditor-not to the benefit of debtor
or to the benefit of other unsecured creditors who had nothing to
do with the mortgagor-mortgagee bargain.
Clearly, Dewsnup overturns Zlogar,12 a federal district court
decision which approved lien stripping by a Chapter 7 debtor and
expressly held that post-petition appreciation would benefit the debtor
and, by implication, Lindsey,129 on which Zlogar is based. The dicta
in Leavell'3 ° which recognizes a general ability of Chapter 7 debtors
to strip liens is also overturned by Dewsnup.
Yet, because the Supreme Court so severely limits the scope of
its rule, Goins v. Diamond Mortgage Corp.'3 is not affected directly.
Also, it is debatable whether the Dewsnup rule has any impact on
cases like In re Ligon.'1 There, the court recognized a right in a
debtor first to obtain a discharge of all personal liability on his home
mortgage in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and then subsequently to use a
Chapter 13 plan to force the mortgagee to accept a cure of all
preexisting defaults on the mortgage during the life of the plan,
allowing debtor to make mortgage payments and avoid foreclosure.
B.

Curing Mortgage Default

34
The 1990 survey article' reported the case of In re Josephs,
which addresses the question of how the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure
Law (IMFL)I 35 interacts with federal bankruptcy law for the purpose
of determining a cut-off for curing and mortgage default. In Josephs,
a Chapter 13 debtor had defaulted on a home mortgage held by first
mortgagee Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA); FNMA
filed foreclosure proceedings in state court; debtors filed their bankruptcy petition after the entry of the judgment of foreclosure, but

128. 101 B.R. I (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 126 B.R. 53 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
129. In re Lindsey, 823 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987).
130. In re Leavell, 124 B.R. 535 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991).
131. Goins, 119 B.R. 156; see supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
132. In re Ligon, 97 B.R. 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
133. Michael R. Howell, et al., Survey of Illinois Law - Real Estate Finance, 14 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 1223, 1252 (1990) [hereinafter Howell].
134. 93 B.R. 151 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
135. Iu. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1101 (1989).
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before any sale pursuant to the judgment. FNMA moved for modification of the automatic stay in order to conclude the foreclosure.
The court held that debtor retained the right to cure after the
foreclosure judgment was entered and during the pre-sale redemption
period "until the passing of the redemption period, the execution of
the judicial sale, and the entry of an order confirming the sale
.. ,"136when title passes to the mortgagee. The survey article pointed
out that there was language in Josephs'3 which might extend the
debtor's right to cure into the special redemption period after the
sale.' The mortgagor has such a special right to redeem after the
sale and for 30 days after the confirmation of sale in very limited
circumstances if the real estate is "residential"; the purchaser at the
sale was a mortgagee and was a party to the foreclosure; and the
sale price was less then the judgment amount.3 9
In re Beaty'40 is a 1990 bankruptcy case concerning the curing
of mortgage defaults. Although Beaty does not involve the question
of the right to cure during the special redemption period,' 41 it does
involve a question, left open by the facts of Josephs, as to the right
of debtor to cure after the sale but before confirmation of the sale.
Beaty also clarifies the nature of the debtor's rights during the period
between the pre-petition sale and the confirmation.
In 1987, debtors obtained a $60,450 mortgage loan to buy a
house. As a result of debtors' default in making payments, mortgagee
filed a foreclosure action in March 1989. In July 1989, a default
judgment of foreclosure was entered with the period of redemption
to end on November 2, 1989. On November 29, 1989, after the
redemption period ended, a sale was held and mortgagee was the
successful bidder. A confirmation hearing was set for December 20,
1989.
On December 15, 1989, debtors filed their Chapter 13 petition
and a plan which proposed to cure the default over an eighteen
month period. If debtors' plan was confirmed, and if debtors complied with that plan, the default would be cured, the mortgage
reinstated, and the house saved. Mortgagee objected to the plan. The
bankruptcy court agreed with the mortgagee and did not confirm the
plan.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Josephs, 93 B.R. at 155.
Id.
Howell, supra note 133, at 1252.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1604(a) (1989).
116 B.R. 112 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1990).
Id.at 115 n.5.
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Judge Ronald Barliant explained that the "sale substantially
changes the rights of both the debtor and the mortgagee."'' 42 The
foreclosure sale terminates the rights of the parties under the mortgage - there was no longer either a mortgage or a default to cure.
As to the provision of IMFL that the sale terminates such interests
"provided that the sale is confirmed ...
,41 the court held that the
mortgagor has only a limited right to remain in possession of the
property for thirty days after the confirmation.'"
C.

State Homestead Exemption

The trustee in In re Szekely, 41 a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, requested
that the debtors be ordered to pay "rent" while they remained in
their home during the proceeding. The trustee argued that the debtors
were using an asset that belonged to the bankrupt estate, not to
them, and that they should be required to pay rent just as anyone
else leasing estate assets would be required to pay rent. In reversing
the bankruptcy judge's rent order of $4,800 for eight months accrued
rent,'" Judge Posner commented, "[t]he argument is fine as far as
it goes, but it doesn't leave much in the way of a homestead
4
exemption."
The debtors, a married couple, declared bankruptcy (originally
under Chapter 13, later converted to Chapter 7) on December 5,
1988. One of their assets was a home on which there was both a
first and second mortgage. Since the State of Illinois had exercised
its option to require debtors to use the state's homestead exemption
in bankruptcy rather than the exemptions set forth in the Bankruptcy
Code itself,'" each of the debtors was entitled to a homestead
exemption of $7,500 for a total of $15,000. 49 The debtors continued
living in their home although they made no payments on either
mortgage. In April 1989, the trustee made his requests for rent. The
bankruptcy court granted the trustee's request in June and fixed rent
at $600 per month. Since the debtors could not pay, it was understood

142. Id. at 115.
143. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1404 (1989).
144. Beaty, 116 B.R. at 115.
145. 936 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1991).
146. The federal district court affirmed the order of the bankruptcy court, In re Szekely,
111 B.R. 681 (N.D. Il. 1990).
147. Szekely, 936 F.2d at 900.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b)(1) (1988).
149. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-1201 (1989).
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that the accrued rent would be deducted from the homestead exemption when the house was sold. Although the house was not yet sold
the debtors vacated the premises in September. In February 1990,
the district court affirmed the rent order of $4,800. The house
eventually was sold for $135,000, an amount $30,000 greater than
the debt owed on the two mortgages. Thus, the proceeds were
sufficient to cover the entire homestead exemption of $15,000.
The issue on appeal to the Seventh Circuit was whether the
$4,800 accrued rent should be deducted from the $15,000 homestead
exemption. The court agreed with the debtors' argument that the
nature of the homestead protection is basically a right of possession"[the] right to remain in one's home, rent-free, until the trustee either
through sale or otherwise can pay the debtor the value of the
exemption." ' 50 The court emphasized the language of the Illinois
statute characterizing the exemption as an "estate of homestead.' ' 5
The court rejected the trustee's characterization of the homestead
exemption as "merely a lien-a claim to $15,000 if and when the
house is sold or the claim, which is freely alienable ... is otherwise
transferred." "2
However, Szekely does not give the Chapter 7 debtor an absolute
right to live in the homestead property rent-free during the pendency
of the bankruptcy, or even until the house is sold. Judge Posner
commented, "[blecause the house belongs to the estate, the trustee
can pay the Szekelys their $15,000 and tell them to skedaddle, and
then rent the house to whomever he pleases until he sells it."'"
D. Perfection of Security Interest in Mobile Home Where the
Chattel Becomes a "Fixture" After Lender Has Perfected a
Security Interest
See discussion in this article at II.B.
V.

LAND TRUST-FIDUCIARY DUTY OF TRUSTEE TO
ASSIGNEE OF ORIGINAL BENEFICIARY

4 involved two reocWilliams v. Independence Bank of Chicago'1
curring issues that arise when a beneficial owner of a land trust

150. Szekely, 936 F.2d. at 901.
151. Id. (quoting ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-901 (1989)).
152. Id. (citing Oixon v. Moiler, 42 111.App. 3d 688, 690, 356 N.E.2d 599, 602 (5th Dist.
1976)).
153. Id. at 902.
154. 201 111.App. 3d 685, 559 N.E.2d 201 (lst Dist. 1990).
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property assigns less than his entire interest in the trust: (1) the
effectiveness of the transfer document; and (2) the duty of the land
trustee to the assignee of the beneficial owner. In May 1981, defendant Independence Bank of Chicago executed a land trust agreement
with two persons who each held fifty percent of the beneficial interest
in the property as tenants in common. According to the agreement,
defendant was only to deal with the property when instructed to do
so in writing or at the direction of Terrell, one of the beneficiaries.
On July 12, 1982, Terrell executed an assignment of 50% of her
beneficial interest to the plaintiff, who had loaned Terrell $120,000
so that she could become current on mortgage payments to First
Federal Savings and Loan Association. First Federal had a first
mortgage of $58,000 on the real e~tate that was the res of the land
trust.
Terrell fell behind on her mortgage payments in spite of the
loan from plaintiff. On February 8, 1983, First Federal filed a
foreclosure action against defendant as trustee. Defendant notified
Terrell of the foreclosure proceedings but did not notify plaintiff.
On April 8, 1983, defendant filed an appearance but did not answer
the foreclosure complaint. A foreclosure sale was held on November
2, 1983. A surplus of $9340 from the sale was forwarded to defendant, who then gave it to Terrell's attorney at Terrell's instruction.
Plaintiff did not learn of the foreclosure until June 13, 1984, after
the redemption period had expired. Plaintiff filed a complaint against
defendant and Terrell, alleging that defendant breached its fiduciary
duty to a beneficiary of the land trust when it failed to notify him
of the foreclosure.
The court examined the document entitled "Assignment of Beneficial Interest," in which Terrelll purported to covey her interest to
plaintiff. This document included the following language:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I Geraldine Terrell do hereby sell,
assign, transfer, set over and convey unto Emmanuel Williams fifty
percent (50%) [of] all my rights, powers, privileges and beneficial
interest in and to a fifty percent (50%) undivided beneficial interest
in and to that certain trust . . . excluding power of direction and
all my interest in the property held subject to said Trust
Agreement .... "I
The trial court found that there was no effective assignment of the
beneficial interest in the res or transfer of the power of direction

155. Williams, 201 111.App. 3d at 688, 559 N.E.2d at 203.

HeinOnline -- 16 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1023 1991-1992

1024

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 16

because the word "excluding" in the document refers to both the
beneficial interest and the power of direction and, hence, plaintiff
had no right to notice of the foreclosure. 5 6
The appellate court disagreed. It looked beyond the plain language of the instrument to surrounding circumstances to derive the
intention of the parties. All such evidence, including the title of the
document and the language in two parts of the document reflected
Terrell's intention to transfer her interest.
Furthermore, the appellate court reversed the summary judgment
in favor of the land trustee on the question of defendant's fiduciary
duty to notify plaintiff even though Terrell retained the exclusive
power of direction. The court explained that "ItJhe sole beneficiary
in a land trust may assign the beneficial interest while at the same
' The court also distinguished
time retaining the power of direction." 157
and limited the rule in Rudolph v. Gersten.' There, the original
beneficiaries of a land trust assigned to themselves and their daughter,
plaintiff, the beneficial interest in the trust. The original beneficiaries
retained the power of direction. Later, one of the original beneficiaries, the father of the assignee, died. Plaintiff's mother, defendant,
directed trustee to convey to a third person who reconveyed to a
new land trust in which defendant was the sole beneficiary of one
of the parcels of land in the trust. Plaintiffs sued claiming one-half
interest in the trust. The Gersten court construed the trust agreement,
assignment, and other documents as evidencing an intent of defendant
and her husband to create a testamentary disposition of the property
because plaintiff paid no consideration for the assignment and the
original beneficiaries retained the sole power of direction. Thus, the
court held that "the Gerstens retained the power to defeat plaintiff's
interest in the trust while either of them was alive . .. . 59
The Williams court cited Kenoe on Land Trusts'6° in support of
limiting Gersten to cases in which the disappointed beneficiary paid
no consideration.' 6' Because defendant trustee was both aware of the
assignment and had accepted and acknowledged receipt of the assignment, defendant had a duty to notify plaintiff of the foreclosure
62
1

proceedings.

156. Id. at 689, 559 N.E.2d at 204.
157. Id. at 690, 559 N.E.2d at 204 (citing Dorman v. Central Nat'l Bank in Chicago, 97
I1. App. 3d 429, 433, 422 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (1st Dist. 1981)).
158. 100 Ill. App. 2d 253, 241 N.E.2d 600 (1st Dist. 1968).
159. Id. at 264, 241 N.E.2d at 605.

160.

HENRY

W.

KENOE, LAND TRUSTS

§ 2.23 (1989).

161. Williams, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 690, 559 N.E.2d at 205.
162. The Court distinguished Alcoa Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 62 Ill. App.
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MISCELLANEOUS MORTGAGE PROBLEMS

Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure-Scope of the Release

The issue in Olney Trust Bank v. Pittsis163 is whether under
IMFL the acceptance by mortgagee of a deed in lieu of foreclosure
from only one of two mortgagors' 64 who held title to the real estate
as joint tenants relieved the non-deeding mortgagor of her debt and
precluded the mortgagee from foreclosing on her interest in the real
estate.
Husband and wife owned certain real estate. Husband owned
tract one solely. Husband and wife owned tract two and tract three
as joint tenants. In 1981, both husband and wife gave the Olney
Trust Bank first mortgages on all three tracts to secure a loan of
$163,000. In January 1985, husband and wife gave Olney Trust Bank
a second mortgage in all three tracts to secure a loan of $198,000.
(Tract 3 was later released from both mortgages.)
When wife filed for dissolution of the marriage in June 1987,
both mortgages were in default. In July 1988, husband conveyed his
interest in both tracts to the bank by way of a deed in lieu of
foreclosure. He also agreed to be jointly liable with wife for whatever
deficiency remained after the foreclosure sale. By the same agreement,
the bank agreed to take immediate steps to foreclose wife's interest
and to sell the two tracts to husband's father for $120,250-$60,250
represented the husband's interest and $60,000 represented the wife's
interest. Bank delivered a quitclaim deed to husband's father; wife
was not a party to the deed or agreement.
In July 1988, bank filed a foreclosure action against wife. She
filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that when bank
accepted the deed in lieu of foreclosure from husband, pursuant to
IMFL, 165 it released her from personal liability, and, because the
mortgage debt was released, bank was precluded from foreclosing
her mortgage interest. The trial court denied her motion for summary
judgment.1l 6
In affirming the trial court, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth
District, held that because husband was the sole owner and sole

3d 510, 379 N.E.2d 66 (1st Dist. 1978), where the trustee had refused to accept the assignment.
201 111. App. 3d at 690-91, 559 N.E.2d at 205.

163. 200 Ill. App. 3d 917, 558 N.E.2d 398 (5th Dist. 1990).
164. Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1401 (1989).
165. ILL. REV.

STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1401 (1989).

166. Pittsi, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 920, 558 N.E.2d at 400.
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mortgagor of tract one, his deed in lieu of foreclosure effectively
conveyed the entire interest in that property to the bank. As to tract
two, husband's deed in lieu of foreclosure severed the joint-tenancy
with Wife and conveyed an undivided one-half to the bank. 167 Wife
retained her one-half undivided interest in tract two.
The appellate court reviewed the legislative history of the statute'o
and discerned a legislative intent to codify prior statutory and case
law, not to make substantial changes. The court noted that IMFL
makes it absolutely clear that a deed in lieu of foreclosure releases
all mortgagors from personal liability. 169
The court agreed with the bank that the statute must be construed
according to each mortgage because the term "mortgagor" is defined
as "the person whose interest in the real estate is the subject of the
mortgage."'7 0 Moreover, the court interprets the term "personal
liability" as referring to the liability for any deficiency after sale of
the mortgaged property, not, as wife argued, to the existing mortgage
debt on the promissory notes prior to foreclosure. Wife's interpretation would be inconsistent with prior law and would be inconsistent
with the anti-merger rule of section 15-1401. A deed in lieu of
foreclosure does not effect a merger of the mortgagee's interest as
mortgagee and the interest mortgagee gets from the deed; hence, the
mortgage debt is not satisfied or extinguished. Rather, it bars the
mortgagee from obtaining or enforcing a deficiency judgment.',
Finally, the court analogized the effect of the non-merger of the
lien and title interest by comparing the release of the deficiency
judgment in exchange for the deed in lieu of foreclosure with the
discharge received by a debtor in bankruptcy.7 2 In bankruptcy, the
release of a debt secured by a mortgage releases the debtor from
personal liability but does not discharge the mortgage lien. The
mortgagee may foreclose the mortgage after bankruptcy of the mortgagor but is forbidden to obtain a deficiency judgment.
173
The issues raised in Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Whitlock
concerned the meaning of the release terms of an "Agreement for

167. Id. at 921, 558 N.E.2d at 400.
168. Id. at 923, 558 N.E.2d at 402.

169. Id. at 924, 558 N.E.2d at 402 (citing Steven C. Lindberg & Wayne F. Bender, The
Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 76 ILL. B.J. 800 (1987)).
170. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1209 (1989)).
171. Id. at 926, 558 N.E.2d at 404.
172. Id. at 925, 558 N.E.2d at 403.
173. 144 Ill. 2d 440, 581 N.E.2d 664 (1991), rev'g 202 I11.App. 3d 609, 560 N.E.2d 460
(4th Dist. 1990).
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Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure." The trial court, affirmed by the
Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, with one dissent, 174 granted
summary judgment in favor of debtors from creditor's foreclosure
on the basis that a general release served as a bar to the foreclosure
suit.
In 1976, parents and their adult children were engaged in separate
farming partnerships. In late 1976, the children attempted to buy a
200 acre farm for $400,000 and asked the bank (plaintiff) for help
in financing. Initially the bank refused, but after discussions with
the children and parents, it agreed to loan the children the entire
purchase price, provided the parents pledged their farm as security.
Two separate loans were arranged. The first loan consisted of a
debt instrument in the amount of $214,200 allocating the loan proceeds as follows: $41,720 to pay off a prior lien on parents' farm;
$160,000 for use by the children in purchasing the new farm; and
$12,452 for closing fees. Loan #1 was secured by a mortgage on
parents' 200 acre farm. Loan #2 consisted of a debt instrument in
the amount of $255,000 to be used for the purchase of the children's
farm. It was secured by a mortgage on the children's farm.'
Loan #1 was executed by the parents and the children (defendants) on February 9, 1977, and Loan #2 was executed by the children
alone on February 10, 1977.176 The father testified in a deposition
that it was the understanding between him and the children that the
parents would continue to pay what they originally owed on their
preexisting mortgage and the children would pay the excess debt on
both loans.
Subsequently, the children defaulted on Loan #2.77 In order to
avoid foreclosure, the bank and the children negotiated a transfer of
the new farm to the bank in exchange for a "Deed in Lieu of
Foreclosure and Mutual Release of Liability" (release agreement). A
pertinent part of the release agreement is set forth in the court's
opinion:
As a part of the consideration of this agreement, Borrower,
and each of them if more than one, for Borrower and for the heirs,
personal representatives, successors and assigns of Borrower, does

174. 202 II1. App. 3d 609, 618, 560 N.E.2d 460, 465 (4th Dist.), rev'd, 144 Ill.
2d 440, 581
N.E.2d 664 (1991).
175. Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Whitlock, 144 II!. 2d 440, 443, 581 N.E.2d 664, 665

(1991).
176. Id. at 444, 581 N.E.2d at 665.
177. Id.
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hereby remise, release and forever discharge The Federal Land Bank
of St. Louis, The Federal Land Bank Association of CarrolltonCarlinville, Illinois, and the officers, employees, directors and
stockholders thereof, and Bank, for itself and its successors and
assigns, does hereby remise, release andforever discharge Borrower,
and each of them if more than one, of and from all manner of
actions, causes and causes of action, suits, debts, sums of money,
accounts, reckonings, bonds, bills, specialties, covenants,
controversies, agreements, promises, variances, trespasses, damages,
judgments, executions, claims and demands, whatsoever, at law or
in equity, and particularly without limiting the generality of the
foregoing all claims relating to the mortgage loan transaction
aforesaidand the conveyance of title hereunder, which either party
and their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors, assigns
and agents ever had, now have or may have in the future, for,
upon or by reason of any matter, cause of thing, whatsoever."'
In January 1987, the bank filed its foreclosure action against
the parents' farm. It is unclear from either the appellate court or
the Illinois Supreme Court opinion as to what triggered this foreclosure. In any event, defendants answered the complaint with an
affirmative defense that the release agreement between the bank and
the children precluded the suit and moved for summary judgment.
The Illinois Supreme Court does not allude to the high emotions
in the early stages of the litigation where plaintiff alleged that the
"pro-farming/anti-banking" sentiment of the trial judge was the
basis for ruling favorably on defendants' summary judgment motion. 79 Indeed, plaintiff had moved for a change of venue, albeit
too late to be successful because it came after the court's ruling on
defendant's motion for summary judgment.8 0
Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court simply found that the general
release was ambiguous on its face. While there are specific references
in the release agreement to Loan #2 and none to Loan #1, the
agreement releases the borrower from all manner of actions, suits,
debts, promises, damages, claims and demands, and, "particularly
without limiting the generality of the foregoing," to all claims relating
to Loan #2.181 The court interpreted this as releasing the borrowers
from all actions and claims, but particularly those relating to Loan

178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 441-42, 581 N.E.2d at 665-66. (Emphasis added by the appellate court.)
Whitlock, 202 111.App. 3d at 617, 560 N.E.2d at 465.
Id.
144 Il1. 2d at 448, 581 N.E.2d at 667.
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#2.182 Since both parties were aware of claims that might arise from
Loan #1, it is not clear, on the face of the agreement, according to
the court, whether the parties' intended to limit the release to Loan
#2 or extend it to Loan #1. A trier of fact would have to determine
the parties' intent from an examination of any extrinsic evidence.
This was never done because of defendants' successful motion for
summary judgment. Hence, a remand to the trial court was ordered.
The court declined to decide the second issue of whether the parents
were accommodation makers of the loan, who had been discharged
of liability in the debt instrument as the circuit court had held. 83
In another farm loan case, Dahl v. Federal Land Bank Association of Western Illinois,'" the debtor farmers brought suit (1) for
damages for breach of a supplemental mortgage contract with lender,
(2) for damages for intentional infliction of emotional harm by
defendant lender, and (3) for damages caused by lenders' duress.
The Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of all three counts. 8
The appellate court held that the second count was barred by
the statute of limitations and that no separate cause of action is
recognized in Illinois for duress-rather, duress is only a defense to
86
the claim of another.
The facts relevant to Count I are as follows. In 1985 plaintiffs
were engaged in farming and, prior to that time, had obtained credit
from all of the defendants-Federal Land Bank of Western Illinois,
Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis, and Central Production Credit
Association. Three of plaintiffs' parcels were separately mortgaged,
securing separate debts to Farm Credit Bank. The plaintiffs had
missed annual payments on two parcels, one in November 1984, and
another in March 1985. In addition, plaintiffs owed a large sum to
Central. In April 1985, fearing he would not be able to make the
annual payment on the third parcel (due in June 1985), Mr. Dahl
met with representatives of Federal Land Bank and Central to work
out a payment plan. It was agreed that if plaintiff executed a
supplemental mortgage on all three parcels and an additional 22 acre
parcel he owned, and made certain payments to Federal Land Bank
and Central, then defendants would forebear pursuing legal remedies

182. Id.
183. 202 Ill. App. 3d at 616, 560 N.E.2d at 464.
184. 213 11. App. 3d 867, 572 N.E.2d 311 (4th Dist. 1991).
185. Id.at 872, 572 N.E.2d at 314.

186. Id.
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available to them. Plaintiffs executed the supplemental mortgage, it
was recorded, and plaintiffs made payments according to the plan.8 7
Nevertheless, in June 1985, in direct contravention of the April
1985 agreement which permitted plaintiffs five years in which to
satisfy the loan, Central informed plaintiffs it was setting September
15, 1985, as a due date on its loan after which it would sue if not
paid in full. Central made repeated demands including urging plaintiffs to sell personalty they had pledged as collateral. Mr. Dahl
became distressed, lost 100 lbs., became ill and confused, and lost
most of the use of his legs. He managed to pay most, but not all,
of the debt to Central. Central continued to pursue the matter, and
Mr. Dahl continued to suffer. 8 By January 1986, Central released
plaintiffs from liability on their loan in exchange for a sum of
money, an automobile, and a baler.
Meanwhile, on December 31, 1985, an officer of Federal Land
Bank telephoned Dahl and threatened legal action unless plaintiffs
deeded two of the three parcels to Farm Credit Bank. This too
violated the April 1985 agreement giving plaintiffs five years to pay.
After repeated phone calls to Mr. Dahl, plaintiffs deeded the two
parcels to Farm Credit Bank on March 16, 1986, and gave a new
mortgage on the third parcel. 8 9 In return for the two parcels, Farm
Credit Bank released plaintiffs of the indebtedness remaining on
those two parcels. Because plaintiffs accepted the benefits of this
Agreement for Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure and Reduction and
Reamortization of Loan, plaintiffs were barred from bringing Count
I, regarding breach of the April 1985 agreement. The court said,
"Plaintiffs will not be permitted to simultaneously treat that entire
transaction as having been in breach of the earlier contract, to accept
the benefits bestowed on them, and to reject its release provisions."' 90
The court noted that defendants had not sued to foreclose on the
two parcels nor to set aside the 1986 transaction.
B.

Mortgagee in Possession

The plaintiff in Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Bergmann'91
filed a complaint to foreclose its mortgage on June 18, 1987. On

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 869, 572 N.E.2d at
Id. at 870, 572 N.E.2d at
Id.
Id. at 871, 572 N.E.2d at
190 11. App. 3d 779, 546

312.
313.
313.
N.E.2d 1171 (5th Dist. 1989).
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October 28, 1987, plaintiff filed a motion to place mortgagee in
possession of the mortgaged premises. The trial court considered a
motion to dismiss the complaint and a motion to strike the plaintiff's
petition to be put in possession. 19 The court entered its order on
November 19, 1987, granting plaintiff's petition to be mortgagee in

possession. 193
An appeal from that order considered whether the trial court
erred. Since the petition of plaintiff expressly was based on the preIMFL law, and since it was not filed until October 1987 (and thus
after IMFL became law on July 1, 1987),1 94 defendant argued that
the petition should have been stricken and plaintiff required to refile
under the new statute. The appellate court reviewed section 15-1106(f)
of the new law'95 that went into effect on November 23, 1987. The
court held that the legislature intended section 15-1106(f) to be applied
retroactively. Therefore, as to all actions filed before July 1, 1987,
the law in effect prior to July 1, 1987, will apply.196 Thus, the
appellate court held that the trial court properly denied defendant's
motion to strike filed November 3, 1987.
The Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, labelled Travelers
Insurance Co. v. LaSalle National Bank, 197 a case of first impression
on the meaning of "good cause" in the statutory requirement that
mortgagors must show good cause in order to refute the presumption
that a non-residential mortgagee has a right to be placed into possession during the pendency of the foreclosure action. 98
Here, on April 1, 1986, defendant LaSalle Bank, as trustee of
a land trust, executed a mortgage in favor of plaintiff to secure a
note for $15,500,000. The note matured on April 30, 1989, and was
not paid on maturity. Plaintiff filed a complaint in foreclosure on
August 19, 1989. The parties executed a stipulation whereby they
agreed to open a joint checking account. However, a paragraph of
the stipulation provided that none of the parties waived any rights,
including plaintiff's right to be made a mortgagee in possession. The
trial court approved the stipulation and entered an order incorporating its terms.

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 781, 546 N.E.2d at 1172.
Id. at 781, 546 N.E.2d at 1173.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1106(f) (1989).
Id. at para. 15-1106(f).
Bergmann, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 546 N.E.2d at 1174-75.
200 Il. App. 3d 139, 558 N.E.2d 579 (2d Dist. 1990).

198. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 15-1701(b)(i)-(2) (1989).
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Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion to be placed into possession pursuant to section 15-1701 of IMFL. Plaintiff alleged that the
mortgage authorized plaintiff to take possession and that there existed
a probability that it would prevail in the foreclosure. The trial court
approved plaintiff's motion, finding the mortgage document so provided and that the court was satisfied plaintiff would prevail.'9
The appellate court rejected defendant's arguments that because
plaintiff had "failed to allege that [mortgagors] had committed any
fraud, mismanagement, waste or other dissipation of the mortgaged
real estate," defendants had demonstrated the statutorily required
"good cause." 2°° The court said the defendants were confusing the
provisions of section 15-1701(b)(1), which applies only in cases of
residential real estate and gives mortgagor a presumption to retain
possession, with section 15-1701(b)(2), which applies in non-residential situations and which reverses the presumption in favor of the
mortgagee if the mortgage documents so provide and if there is a
probability of the mortgagee prevailing. Only if mortgagor rebuts
this strong statutory presumption by showing good cause (still undefined by this case) will mortgagee fail in efforts to be placed in
possession. Here, defendants' unverified answer and affirmative defenses only went to the amount of interest owed, and the stipulation
did not preclude plaintiff from being placed in possession. Therefore,
the court held that no sufficient "good cause" was shown. 20 ,
C. Redemption Period Under IMFL Cannot Be Extended by
Exercise of Court's Equitable Powers
In Margaretten & Co. v. Martinez,2 2 mortgagors appealed from
denial of their motion to vacate an order approving sale of their
home pursuant to foreclosure and for an injunction to stay their
eviction from the home. Mortgagors argued that because the trial
court set the wrong deadline for redemption, they could have redeemed within the limits of the correct deadline.
Although defendant-mortgagor filed a pro se appearance, the
defendants failed to answer or otherwise plead to a complaint for
foreclosure filed by plaintiff. The trial court entered a default judg-

199. 200 IMl.App. 3d at 142, 558 N.E.2d at 581.
200. Id. at 144, 558 N.E.2d at 582.
201. Id. at 145-46, 558 N.E.2d at 583.
202. 193 Ill.
App. 3d 223, 550 N.E.2d 8 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 132 Ill.
2d 546, 555
N.E.2d 377 (1990).
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ment on September 16, 1988, and provided that the redemption
period would expire on January 25, 1989.
On February 15, 1989, non-parties purchased the property at
the post-redemption foreclosure sale. That same day, the trial court
issued an order confirming the sale and granting possession to
purchasers after 30 days. On April 3, 1989, defendants presented a
motion to vacate the February 15th order and prohibit their eviction.
In support of their motions to vacate and for an injunction,
defendants argued that because the husband was not residing with
his wife, he was never properly served by the sheriff. Husband
further argued that since he was never properly served, the seven
month redemption period should have been calculated from the date
he filed his appearance and submitted to the jurisdiction of the court
(July 22, 1988) rather than the date of service of his wife (June 24,
1988). This would mean the redemption period ran until February
22, 1989, rather than January 25, 1989, as set forth by the trial
court's order. Moreover, husband gave an affidavit stating that he
appeared in court on February 15, 1989, and advised the judge that
he had the money to redeem. The trial judge advised him that he
was too late.
While the appellate court agreed that the trial court was in error
in setting the redemption period, 2 3 it affirmed the trial court's denial
of defendants' April 3rd motion to vacate and for permission to
redeem even after the correct redemption period had expired. The
court noted cases where a court of equity had permitted redemption
after the statutory period had expired "if fraud, mistake, or some
infirmity ... of a public official" was present or the purchaser
prevented redemption during the period. 20 However, those cases
predated IMFL. Section 15-1605 of IMFL provides: "No equitable
right of redemption shall exist or be enforceable under or with respect
to a mortgage after a judieial sale of the mortgaged real estate
....

205

Here, a judgment of foreclosure and judicial sale had been

held before defendants presented their motions. The February 15,
1989, order confirming the sheriff's sale was a final order. Defendants
did not file their motion to vacate until forty-three days later; yet
the only statutory basis for attacking final orders more than thirty
days after the entry2°6 requires petitioner to show due diligence in

203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 226, 550 N.E.2d at 9 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1603(b) (1989)).
Id. at 227, 550 N.E.2d at 10.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-1605 (1989).
Id. para. 2-1401.
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filing the motion to vacate. Here, defendants offered no excuse for
their failure to raise the errors of the trial court for more than six
months after entry of the foreclosure decree and for forty-seven days
after entry approving the sale. The trial court properly denied defendants' motion.
D.

Acceleration of Debt-Triggered by Due on Sale Clause

Mercado v. Calumet Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n 2°7 is one
of those cases where one wonders what is really at stake in light of
the extensive and ongoing litigation. Here, plaintiff had established
a land trust in 1976 with River Oaks as trustee. The entire beneficial
interest in the trust, which property consisted of a single family home
in which plaintiff and her son resided, vested in plaintiff. On April
29, 1979, plaintiff made an application for re-financing for a new
loan of $20,500 with a mortgage in favor of River Oaks executed
on May 29, 1979. The mortgage provided:
That in the event of ownership of said property or any part thereof
becomes vested in a person other than the Mortgagor *** the
undersigned further agrees that in the event of the sale, assignment
or pledge by the mortgagor of the property (or any interest therein)
which is the subject of this mortgage, the mortgagee or its assigns
may at its option, declare the entire balance of principle and interest
remaining due hereunder at that time, immediately due and payable. 20
On May 20, 1983, defendant sent plaintiff a notice of default
stating that plaintiff had breached the mortgage by selling the home
to her son without obtaining its consent. Defendant reported that it
had been put on notice of the alleged sale by a copy of the
homeowner's insurance policy for 1983-1984 which it had received.
The policy indicated that the son was a contract purchaser and
beneficiary of the trust and that plaintiff no longer had the same
address as her son. Defendant elected to exercise its option to
accelerate the mortgage and warned plaintiff it would foreclose if it
did not receive full payment within thirty days.
On November 18, 1983, plaintiff filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to stop the
acceleration. Plaintiff based its intriguing action on an alleged violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. 2°9 The district

207. 196 I11.App. 3d 483, 554 N.E.2d 305 (1st Dist. 1990).
208. Id. at 485, 554 N.E.2d at 307.
209. Id. at 486, 554 N.E.2d at 307.
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court granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
210
cause of action. The Seventh Circuit upheld plaintiff's appeal.
Following the federal lawsuits, defendant notified plaintiff that
$7,500 had been added to the mortgage amount. This represented
attorney fees incurred defending the federal litigation. Defendant
argued that the mortgage provided that mortgagor would be liable
for reasonable attorney fees for litigation concerning the mortgage
document.
Thereafter, plaintiff, on December 17, 1986, tendered the balance
owed on the mortgage, minus the attorney fees. Defendant would
not release the mortgage without payment of the attorney fees.
Plaintiff sued in the Circuit Court of Cook County asking the court
to order defendant to tender the release and to deny defendant's
request for attorney fees.
Defendant claimed it was entitled to accelerate because plaintiff
had misrepresented that the premises were to be owner-occupied and
because plaintiff sold the home without defendant's approval. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on May 13, 1987, asking
the court to remove the attorney fee assessment and order the release
of the mortgage. On June 23, 1987, defendant moved for summary
judgment. Defendant filed the affidavit of a loan officer regarding
circumstances surrounding the making of the loan and the revelation
of the change in ownership. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion
and set the case for a bench trial on September 17, 1987, to determine
whether the attorney fee assessment was reasonable. In spite of
testimony at trial that the sales contract between plaintiff and her
son was drawn up at defendant's request, that defendant indicated
it would recognize son as the owner if he would pay a higher interest
rate, and that defendant was at all times aware of the "private
agreement" between plaintiff and her son, the circuit court held that
defendant's acceleration was done with good cause and defendant's
claim for fees was reasonable.
After discussing the case law on the issue of whether a transfer
of a beneficial interest in a land trust necessarily triggers a due on
sale clause,2 1' the appellate court reversed on the ground that there
was insufficient evidence in the record for the trial court to conclude
that defendant had threatened acceleration for good cause. It also
remanded the case to the trial court because the trial court judge

210. Mercardo v. Calumet Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985).
211. Mercardo, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 488-90, 554 N.E.2d at 309-10.
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had expressly and erroneously refused to hear evidence on whether
the acceleration was "rightful or wrongful. '21 2 The appellate court
also noted discrepancies in the record on the matter of reasonableness
of the attorney fees. For example, the bill listed 1'/2 hours of work
on December 24, 1983, even though defense counsel admitted his
office was closed on that date.2" 3 A remand on this issue was also
ordered. And so it goes ...
VII.

FINAL CASE-LEGAL MALPRACTICE

The plaintiff brought an action in FirstNational Bank of Moline
v. Califf, Harper, Fox & Dailey14 to recover money damages for the
negligent preparation of mortgage documents by its borrower's attorney. The Appellate Court, Third District, affirmed the trial court's
dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.
In August 1982, business owners found it necessary to secure a
business loan. They negotiated with plaintiff who agreed to lend the
money if the Small Business Administration (SBA) would guarantee
the loan. The borrowers hired an attorney with defendant's law firm
to help in procuring and finalizing the loan. The SBA required
borrowers to give a second mortgage on their home as security for
the loan. Plaintiff forwarded SBA form documents to defendant
attorney and asked him to fill them out and have his clients execute
them. The attorney had his clients execute the mortgage individually,
whereas the proper course would have been to have the document
executed by a land trustee since title to the home was in a land trust.
Subsequently, borrowers gave a third mortgage on the property and
filed for bankruptcy protection. In the bankruptcy proceeding, plaintiff's mortgage was declared invalid because the land trustee never
pledged its interest. Plaintiff was classified as a general creditor and
received no benefit.
The SBA made a demand on plaintiff (settled for $22,500)
because plaintiff had failed to meet one of the conditions of the
loan guarantee-obtaining a second mortgage on borrower's house.
Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the attorney's employer, a professional corporation, for his negligence.
Since the plaintiff was unable to allege the existence of a duty
owed by defendant to plaintiff, the court followed the general rule

212. Id. at 491, 554 N.E.2d at 311.
213. Id. at 494, 554 N.E.2d at 312.
214. 193 Ill.
App. 3d 83, 548 N.E.2d 1361 (3d Dist. 1989).
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of law that an attorney owes a professional obligation only to his
client. 215 The court rejected plaintiff's argument that there is an
exception when the attorney representation is non-adversarial and
intended to benefit both the clients and the lender. The court refused
to extend the exception to the general rule of Pelham v. Griesheimer, 216 which required that the primary intent and purpose of the
attorney-client relationship must be to benefit the third party. Here,
at most, if plaintiff is correct, it benefitted both.

215. Id. at 85-86, 548 N.E.2d at 1363 (citing Byron Chamber of Commerce v. Long, 92 Il1.
App. 3d 864, 868, 415 N.E.2d 1361, 1364 (3d Dist. 1981)).
216. 92 II1. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96 (1982).
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